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Liability for work done where contract is
denied: contractual and restitutionary
approaches
Man Yip* and Yihan Goh**
This paper explores the divide between the law of contract and the law of
restitution in dealing with the different situations that arise from one party
commencing work prior to the conclusion of a formal contract. It argues that
contract and unjust enrichment each have a proper role to play in dealing with
such cases. First, it argues against a purely contractarian view that such cases
should be exclusively resolved by the law of contract, through an implied
collateral contract. Such a technique, applied vigorously, would result in
nullifying the concept of ‘‘essential terms’’ and an artificial construction of
parties’ intentions. Second, it dispels the myths that the law of unjust enrichment
is inadequate to deal with the problem, by clarifying the enrichment test and the
unjust factor to be applied in such cases. It will be shown that the defendant’s
assumption of the risk of financial responsibility for the benefit is key to
establishing these two elements of the claim.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not unusual for parties to commence work while negotiations on the contractual terms
that are to govern their relationship are continuing. However, if negotiations break down
and no formal contract is concluded, contractual,1 as well as restitutionary,2 disputes may
well arise between the parties as to liability for the work already done. That different bases
of liability are possible is not problematic in itself; problems arise when different courts
come to different conclusions based on the same facts.3 Putting aside issues of evidence,
this generates uncertainty in the law. Prominent commentators in this area generally
advocate using principally one area of the law to deal with such disputes so as to avoid
any uncertainty. Some of these commentators posit the expansion of doctrines which are
* Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University.
** Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.
We would like to thank Professor Tiong Min Yeo and Associate Professor Chee Ho Tham for their helpful
comments on the earlier drafts of this paper. We are also grateful for the comments from the anonymous referee.
All errors remain our own.
1. Way v Latilla [1927] 3 All ER 759.
2. British Steel Corp v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 504; Vedatech Corp v Crustral
Decisions (UK) Ltd [2002] EWHC 818; Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008] UKHL 65; [2009] Bus
LR 72; [2008] 1 WLR 1752; Whittle Movers Ltd v Hollywood Express Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1189; [2009] 2
CLC 771.
3. See, eg, RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH & Co KG (UK Production) [2008]
EWHC 1087 (TCC); rvsd [2009] EWCA Civ 26; [2009] BLR 181; rvsd [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] Bus LR 776;
[2010] 1 WLR 754.
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alien to English law (as it currently stands) to deal with the problem. This paper, however,
argues that contract and unjust enrichment each have a proper role to play and this requires
bright doctrinal lines be drawn between these two areas of law.
II. CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS
There are at least three contemporary approaches. The first is an exclusively contractual
solution, with no room or need for any restitutionary remedy.4 This approach rests on the
key supposition that the situations involving ‘‘precontractual’’ liability invariably involve
an agreement between the parties that the work would be paid for.
The second approach posits that unjust enrichment—which is commonly thought to be
applicable only in the absence of a contract—can solve most of the problems of
precontractual liability.5 On this thinking, since restitution can provide a solution, the
scope of operation of the contractual approach may correspondingly be limited.6
The third approach is to find a solution presently unrecognised by English law.7 One
such solution is to extend the principle in the doctrine of proprietary estoppel to
commercial cases for the protection of certain forms of precontractual reliance.8 Another
solution is to develop a precontractual duty of good faith straddling tort and contract, akin
to the civilian concept of culpa in contrahendo.9
This paper will not deal with the third approach (and its associated solutions) for two
reasons. First, it is obvious that these solutions cannot be satisfactorily applied as part of
English law, without extensive modifications of English law itself. For instance,
proprietary estoppel, let alone a more expansive notion of it, may have little or no role in
the commercial context, owing to the importance of certainty and the primacy of contract
in such relationships.10 In so far as a precontractual duty of good faith is concerned, that
will inevitably involve recognising the existence of ‘‘shades of grey’’ of liability in
English law, which would fundamentally change how English law works.11
4. S Hedley, ‘‘Enrichment’’, ch.5 of S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law
(Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2008); P Davies, ‘‘Anticipated Contracts: More Room for Agreement’’ [2010] CLJ
467.
5. E McKendrick, ‘‘Work Done in Anticipation of a Contract which does not Materialise’’, in W Cornish,
R Nolan, J O’Sullivan and G Virgo (eds), Restitution Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth
Jones (Hart, Oxford, 1998), 163.
6. Whittle Movers Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1189, [15]; Proactive Sports Management Ltd v Rooney [2010]
EWHC 1807 (QB), [776]. The plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed in part (see [2011] EWCA
Civ 1444) although that does not affect the present point being made.
7. For less civil law-oriented analysis, see J Beatson, ‘‘Benefit, Reliance, and the Structure of Unjust
Enrichment’’, ch.2 of The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon, Oxford, 1991); and S Stoljar,
‘‘Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice’’ (1987) 50 MLR 603. However, the unjust sacrifice approach has not
been well received: see, eg, A Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (OUP, Oxford, 2011), 30–31.
8. B McFarlane, ‘‘The Protection of Pre-contractual Reliance: A Way Forward?’’ (2010) 9(2) OUCLJ 95.
9. J Dietrich, ‘‘Classifying Pre-contractual Liability: A Comparative Analysis’’ (2001) 21 LS 153.
10. N Piska, ‘‘Hopes, Expectations and Revocable Promises in Proprietary Estoppel’’ (2009) 72(6) MLR 998.
McFarlane, a proponent of the estoppel solution, suggests that reliance may be reasonable if an agreement in
principle is in place and one party has promised to honour that agreement: see McFarlane (2010) 9(2) OUCLJ
95, 121. Such a suggestion however severely limits the availability of an estoppel solution, as parties often
conduct negotiations on a ‘‘subject to contract’’ basis. See also A Silink, ‘‘Equitable Estoppel in ‘subject to
contract’ Negotiations’’ (2011) 5 J Eq 252.
11. Dietrich (2001) 21 LS 153, 185.
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Second, and more importantly, we do not agree that the existing approaches within
English law are so unsatisfactory as to justify a search for novel solutions. The problem
lies in the present lack of precision in distinguishing how the law of contract and the law
of unjust enrichment both have relevant roles to play in dealing with the problem. To some
extent, this has been exacerbated by the lack of clarity in the content of the law of unjust
enrichment.
The first and second approaches described above commonly focus on a dominant
approach with no or little room for an alternative. In contrast, this paper takes the view that
there can be room for applying both contract and unjust enrichment analyses, provided
that clear doctrinal lines are drawn between them. In order to show this, the third part of
this paper (which immediately follows this) will discuss the limitations of the implied
collateral contract technique.
The fourth part of this paper will argue that the recognition of this contractual model
does not preclude the operation of the restitutionary model. This involves addressing two
questions: first, why the law of unjust enrichment should allow recovery in some cases
when the law of contract denies recovery; and secondly, why there is a need for unjust
enrichment analysis (instead of contract) if the cases essentially involve some form of
agreement that the services performed will be paid for.
The fifth and final part will propose a principled framework for the claim in unjust
enrichment, specifically addressing the problems associated with identifying and quantify-
ing the enrichment as well as finding the unjust factor for the claim.
III. THE CONTRACTUAL MODEL
A. General principles
Somewhat ironically, a claim for work done in anticipation of a contract may nonetheless
lie in contract. Through their conduct, the parties may have come to an agreement without
the execution of formal documents, or they may have reached an agreement of a smaller
scope.12 The legal device through which these possibilities are reached is the (real)
implied contract.13
An agreement, whose terms are implied by conduct rather than by express words or
signed documents between the contracting parties, is an implied contract. Such contracts
will not be implied unless necessary.14 It has been said that ‘‘necessary’’ means to give
‘‘business reality to a transaction and to create enforceable obligations between parties
who are dealing with one another in circumstances in which one would expect that
12. A similar idea is that of the ‘‘provisional’’ contract. McGuinness argues that in some situations where
work has started before a contract is concluded, there will be a ‘‘provisional contract’’, which is decipherable
from the objectively ascertainable documents exchanged between the parties: see J McGuinness, The Law and
Management of Building Subcontracts, 2nd edn (Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), 19. This idea is supposedly derived
from the judgment of HHJ Thornton QC in Hall & Tawse South Ltd v Ivory Gate Ltd [1996] 62 Con LR 117,
[3].
13. This can be distinguished from historical quasi-contract, which has been rejected explicitly in
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 710 (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson).
14. Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274; [2002] 1 All ER (Comm)
737.
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business reality and those enforceable obligations to exist’’.15 This reiterates that the
courts should be slow to imply a contract, unless there is cogent evidence to demonstrate
that the formation requirements are satisfied.16 Indeed, no contract will be implied if the
parties have acted inconsistently with an intention to contract.17
B. The limits of the contractual model
1. An elaboration of the implied contract approach
The implied contract approach has been used by both courts and academics to explain
liability for work done in anticipation of a contract. Havelock, in a recent article, argues
that the implied contractual approach can indeed be used where the facts support an
implication.18 According to Havelock, such situations arise where there is either an
‘‘express undertaking’’ of responsibility by the defendant over the services provided or an
‘‘informal arrangement’’ between the parties to the same effect.19 While we agree that a
contract can be implied on an express undertaking of liability, some caution needs to be
exercised in relation to the implication of the same through an ‘‘informal arrangement’’.
As Havelock also seems to suggest,20 certain cases that were seemingly resolved by an
implied contract may well be wrongly decided from a doctrinal perspective.21
Thus, notwithstanding the utility of the contractual model, it should not be over-
stretched. The key to implied contracts is the finding of an intention to contract. In
particular, as we will see below, there is a need to be clear as to what the parties intended.
An intention to contract cannot extend to each and every conceivable contract of whatever
scope. The intention to contract must be tied to a specific scope of contract.22 In a recent
article, Davies argues that cases of anticipated contracts can be resolved exclusively
within contract and so there is neither room nor need for restitution.23 He suggests that,
even if the parties did not reach the hoped-for main contract, there could be a collateral
agreement of a smaller scope as long as it can be established that the parties have ‘‘agreed
that the services would be paid for’’.24 The ‘‘consensual nature of the transaction’’ puts it
within contract.25
Davies’ proposed contractual approach is founded on three basic tenets. First,
contracting parties may reach a collateral agreement of a smaller scope than the hoped-for
main contract that had been the subject matter of the parties’ negotiations. In a proposed
main contract containing several cross-promises, Davies’ proposition necessarily means
15. The Elli [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 107, 115 (May LJ).
16. That parties had relied on the agreement only makes it easier for the court to find that there is an
enforceable agreement and imply a term to resolve any uncertainty: see G Percy Trentham Ltd v Archital Luxfer
Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 25.
17. This is particularly the case if they would or might have acted exactly as they did in the absence of a
contractual relationship: The Aramis [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213, 224 (Bingham LJ).
18. R Havelock, ‘‘Anticipated Contracts That Do Not Materialise’’ [2011] RLR 72.
19. Ibid., 75–77.
20. Ibid., 77.
21. An example given was Latchin v General Mediterranean Holdings SA [2003] EWCA Civ 1786.
22. See, eg, Eugena Ltd v Gelande Corp Ltd [2004] EWHC 3273 (QB), [85–87] in which the court correctly
limited the scope of the contract argued for upon examination of the relevant evidence.
23. Davies [2010] CLJ 467.
24. Ibid., 471.
25. Ibid.
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that those cross-promises are capable of forming separate collateral agreements. Second,
such collateral contracts are not unenforceable even if the parties did not agree on the
exact price for the work done.26 What matters is that there is an ‘‘agreement’’ to pay for
the work done and the court can fill in the ‘‘gaps’’ through the implication of terms.
Finally, such collateral contracts are not precluded by a ‘‘subject to contract’’ clause in the
draft main contract under negotiation because such a clause only precludes the formation
of the main contract and not the collateral contract.27 While Davies’ approach appears
simple and elegant,28 a close scrutiny reveals that it is not entirely free from problems.
2. The validity of collateral contracts
Davies’ key proposition is that collateral agreements may be made between the parties
which effectively contain terms found in the hoped-for main contract. The validity of such
collateral contracts depend on, first, the presence of essential terms and secondly, and
more fundamentally, the parties’ intention for such contracts.
(a) Essential terms
First, the continued relevance of ‘‘essential terms’’ is important in considering this
question.29 It is trite law that, before there can be a concluded contract, its terms must be
certain and the agreement must similarly be complete.30 The requirement of certainty is
such that the court is not required to make the contract for the parties. Accordingly, where
the parties are not agreed on ‘‘essential terms’’,31 the courts will not ‘‘make’’ the contract
for the parties by implying agreement on such terms.
Davies relies on Rix LJ’s judgment in Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co SA v Okta
Crude Oil Refinery AD32 and the relatively recent decision of the Supreme Court in RTS
Flexible Systems v Mu¨ller33 for the proposition that courts should strive to ‘‘preserve
rather than destroy’’ bargains and, where commercial transactions are concerned, the
courts would be willing to fill in ‘‘gaps’’ in the contract by implying the necessary terms.34
However, since agreement on certain essential terms is a precondition to the formation of
a contractual relationship, there is nothing to ‘‘preserve’’ unless and until there is
agreement on those terms. Indeed, based on the various principles set out by Rix LJ in
Mamidoil-Jetoil, it is obvious that courts should only play a facilitative role in preserving
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 474.
28. It is not disputed that the failure to prove the existence of the main contract ought not to prevent the proof
of the existence of an implied contract of a smaller scope.
29. Of course, as pointed out in Barbudev v Eurocom Cable Management Bulgaria EOOD [2011] EWHC
1560 (Comm), [104], it is for the parties to decide at what stage they wish to be bound, and they can agree to
be bound even though there are terms that remain to be agreed. However, this is still subject to satisfying the
requirement of essentiality.
30. G Scammell and Nephew Ltd v HC and JG Ouston [1941] AC 251.
31. See M Furmston and G J Tolhurst, Contract Formation: Law and Practice (OUP, Oxford, 2010), 324.
32. [2001] EWCA Civ 406; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 76.
33. [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] Bus LR 776.
34. Davies [2010] CLJ 467, 471.
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a bargain.35 Nowhere in the judgment was it suggested that an agreement may be foisted
on the parties where none existed, especially if an essential term is absent. Thus, even if
a contract may be broken down into a number of collateral agreements, in so far as one
or more of such agreements are short of an essential term, it ought not to be possible for
the court to ‘‘fill in’’ such lack using the process of implication of terms.
Nor have recent cases done away with the requirement of an essential term.36 Although
Davies takes Mu¨ller as support for the proposition that only ‘‘very rarely will a term be
considered ‘essential’ if performance has been requested and accepted’’,37 that statement
does not deny the continued relevance of the concept. Further, it is relevant that the
Supreme Court in Mu¨ller found that the parties had concluded the main contract. The price
had been agreed, extensive work had been undertaken and variations were not agreed
‘‘subject to contract’’. It was not a case where the court had stripped away the uncertainty
and artificially ‘‘preserved’’ a collateral contract of a smaller scope relating to the
performance of the work. As such, Mu¨ller does not concern a ‘‘collateral contract’’ and it
is of little support for Davies’ thesis. In contrast, Robert Goff J, in British Steel Corp v
Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd,38 despite having referred to the possibility of
an ‘‘if’’ contract, was still concerned that the parties had reached agreement on the ambit
of their liability. That he regarded as an essential term which must be enforced together
with any agreement as to price.
Both Mu¨ller and British Steel show further that the breaking down of a complex
commercial contract into discrete promises each forming a binding contract is not usual.
In both cases, the respective courts were looking at package transactions comprising the
parties’ liabilities and benefits: in Mu¨ller the Supreme Court was concerned with the
parties’ principal contract; and in British Steel the court was concerned with the possibility
of a collateral contract with the requisite essential terms (as distinguished from a smaller
‘‘if’’ contract argued by the defendant). The general need for package transactions is also
illustrated by the ‘‘battle of form’’ cases. As is well known, the majority judges in Butler
Machine Tool Co v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) Ltd39 accepted the traditional approach in
resolving such ‘‘battles’’, which looks to when a particular party finally concedes by way
of an unqualified acceptance.40 This shows that commercial contracts, subject to precise
construction on the facts, generally come in packages. When commercial parties
negotiate, they contemplate not the formation of discrete contracts, but a general contract
which takes into account their general liabilities and benefits. To separate such a general
contract into discrete collateral contracts seems to be unrealistic.
(b) An ‘‘agreement’’ to pay for the work is not necessarily an enforceable contract
Another danger of over-broadening the implied contract approach is that of hindsight
reasoning. The danger of such reasoning is most clearly seen by a contractual resolution
35. Mamidoil-Jetoil [2001] EWCA Civ 406; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 76, [69]. For example, where the parties
have ‘‘acted in the belief that they had a binding contract’’ or where they ‘‘may desire or need to leave matters
to be adjusted in the working out of the contract’’.
36. See, eg, Barbudev [2011] EWHC 1560 (Comm).
37. Davies [2010] CLJ 467, 474.
38. [1984] 1 All ER 504.
39. [1979] 1 WLR 401.
40. As opposed to a mere counter-offer.
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of Whittle Movers v Hollywood Express41 as proposed by Davies.42 The parties in that case
were negotiating for a long-term contract for the supply of services. Prior to the
conclusion of a formal contract, Whittle Movers commenced work and invoiced based on
the price agreed during the parties’ negotiations and subsequent invoices reflected the
progress of the negotiations. Hollywood accepted the services and paid some of those
invoices. Before the trial judge, both parties’ primary case was that there was a contract.
Whittle Movers argued that a long-term contract had been concluded. The trial judge held
that there was an ‘‘interim contract’’ entered into and the price was that as agreed between
the parties during the negotiations for a long-term contract. On appeal, Whittle Movers
argued that it had a claim in unjust enrichment instead.
Davies equates the defendant’s undertaking of financial responsibility for the work, the
claimant’s performance of the work, and the defendant’s acceptance of the work as
amounting to there being a consensus ad idem as to a collateral contract of a smaller
scope.43 But Davies’ view is open to challenge. There is a difference between performing
work in anticipation of a concluded long-term agreement and an intention to enter into a
collateral agreement of a much smaller scope. Returning to our example, the parties in
Whittle Movers never considered a collateral agreement. They were dedicated to
concluding a long-term agreement, as evidenced by Whittle’s invoices that reflected the
development of the negotiations between the parties for a long-term contract. It is artificial
to say that there had been offer and acceptance when it was unknown to Whittle that it was
an offer to procure work on an interim basis and the rate of remuneration for the work had
not been discussed between the parties. The parties in Whittle Movers had simply taken
a voluntary risk that a long-term agreement would be concluded. At best, the parties
understood that the work would not be performed for free. Such an understanding, even
if accompanied by a partial or substantial performance of the work, cannot automatically
amount to a contractual arrangement of a scope the parties had never contemplated. This
is because the intention must be aimed at such a specific arrangement; anything short of
it will not suffice.
3. Implying terms
Davies’ suggestion that an essential term such as the rate of remuneration may be implied
into the collateral contract of a smaller scope cannot be true all the time. This is illustrated
by Way v Latilla.44 In that case, there was no agreement between the parties on the rate
of remuneration for the plaintiff’s obtaining gold-mining concessions for the defendant,
although there was an agreement on the type of remuneration. The House of Lords held
that no contract was made but granted remuneration on the basis that there was a second
contract of employment between the parties, with Lord Atkin stating that it was ‘‘plain that
there existed between the parties a contract of employment’’.45 The ‘‘plainness’’ of the
existence of such a collateral contract stems from the underlying presumption that
41. [2009] EWCA Civ 1189; [2009] 2 CLC 771.
42. Davies [2010] CLJ 467, 471; P Davies, ‘‘Contract and Unjust Enrichment: A Blurry Divide’’ (2010) 126
LQR 175.
43. Davies [2010] CLJ 467, 471.
44. [1937] 3 All ER 759.
45. Ibid., 763.
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‘‘commercial parties confer benefits in the expectation of receiving payment’’.46 However,
it remains controversial as to whether Way v Latilla, which predated the recognition of the
principle of unjust enrichment in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd,47 should now be
understood as part of the law of unjust enrichment which justifies the imposition of fair
value for work done.48 This point of controversy was discussed in Benedetti v Sawiris,49
with Arden LJ taking the view that Way v Latilla concerns restitutionary quantum meruit50
and Etherton LJ taking the opposite view, that the case was ‘‘a classic case of a contractual
term to pay reasonable remuneration’’.51
Whether terms can be implied to resolve problems of uncertainty or incompleteness is
heavily dependent on the facts of the case. But, as a matter of principle, there is a
difference between implication of terms pursuant to what the parties agreed at the point
of formation and implication of terms post-contract formation to ensure that the contract
is workable. Where there is already an intention to contract on the specific scale (as
evident from implication of terms post-formation), it is less objectionable to imply a term
to make that contract work. However, where the parties did not contemplate a contract of
a smaller scale, then a term should not be implied in order to ensure that contract’s
formation in the first place. In such cases, the contract will generally be unenforceable for
uncertainty or incompleteness. As Maugham LJ said in the oft-cited English Court of
Appeal decision of Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd:52
‘‘unless all the material terms of the contract are agreed there is no binding agreement. An
agreement to agree in future is not a contract; nor is there a contract if a material term is neither
settled nor implied by law and the document contains no machinery for ascertaining it’’.
Such statements are easy to make but difficult to apply. It is submitted that the correct
approach depends on two factors, viz, whether the parties intended anything in addition to
the ‘‘essential term’’ that is sought to be upheld and whether the contract in its present
form is workable. Although the courts have turned to established business practice,53
previous dealings of the parties,54 and even the test of ‘‘reasonableness’’55 to ascertain the
completeness of contracts, the parties’ intention is all important. Therefore, in Perry v
Suffields Ltd,56 an offer to sell a public house with vacant possession for £7,000 was
accepted without qualification because the parties intended so without any ‘‘extra’’
provisions relating to, inter alia, the date for completion and the payment of deposit. An
intention to be bound solely by price seems easy to find since price is the fundamental
touchstone of a contract. However, if price was not agreed between the parties, the courts
have still been willing to imply a price, but only if there was found to be a prior intention
46. S Hedley, ‘‘Work done in Anticipation of a Contract which does not Materialise: A Response’’, in W
Cornish, R Nolan, J O’Sullivan and G Virgo (eds), Restitution Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of
Gareth Jones (Hart, Oxford, 1998), 197.
47. [1991] 2 AC 548.
48. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (2011), 373.
49. [2010] EWCA Civ 1427.
50. Ibid., [53]
51. Ibid., [148].
52. [1934] 2 KB 1, 13.
53. Hillas v Arcos (1932) 147 LT 503.
54. Ibid.
55. Sudbrook v Eggleton [1983] AC 444.
56. [1916] 2 Ch 187.
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to have the price settled by recourse to reasonable means.57 Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd58
is a good example: an option to buy timber was held binding although there was no price
specified because it provided for the price to be calculated by reference to the official price
list. On the other hand, it would be inappropriate to imply a term of reasonable
remuneration in two types of case: first, where the parties have very different views as to
the rate of remuneration which was the precise reason why they could not agree on the
contract price in the first place, and second, where the parties have not addressed their
minds to the rate of remuneration. To imply a term on price in either type of case is to
impose an intention on the parties. This is all the more inappropriate where the term is
implied to find an implied contract.
The second element of ‘‘workability’’ is related to the requirement of certainty such that
the court is not required to make the contract for the parties. Given freedom of contract,
courts are not going to construct a contract between the parties if the terms are uncertain.
Thus, in G Scammell & Nephew Ltd v Ouston,59 the House of Lords refused to enforce an
agreement to acquire goods ‘‘on hire-purchase’’ because it was not possible to decipher
what sort of hire-purchase terms the parties had agreed. The precise factual matrix is, in
the final analysis, all important, bearing in mind the important fact that the focus ought
always be on the substance of the transaction. Conversely, in Perry, it was possible for the
court to conclude that some contractual agreement had been reached since the parties were
agreed that the public house was to be sold for £7,000 and, accordingly, the parties could
be taken to have agreed to a simple agreement of sale.
4. Two interpretations of ‘‘subject to contract’’
Where negotiations are conducted on a ‘‘subject to contract’’ basis, Davies takes the view
that such clauses do not preclude the formation of a collateral contract because that clause
merely precludes the main contract. On this narrow interpretation of the phrase, the
question becomes whether a collateral contract can be implied, a question already
discussed in the preceding section. It is, however, an open question whether ‘‘subject to
contract’’ clauses must necessarily be construed in such a manner.
There seems to be no reason why ‘‘subject to contract’’ clauses may not be read more
broadly to preclude any contractual relationship between the parties further to the letter of
intent pending the conclusion of a formal contract, including Davies’ collateral contract.
By this reading, the pertinent question is not whether a collateral contract can be
implied,60 but whether the parties have waived the ‘‘subject to contract’’ requirement.
Establishing whether there is such a waiver on the facts of the case requires us, then, to
consider the intentions of the parties which might underlie their mutual communications
and dealings, in the period following the issue of the letter of intent. The requirement that
57. This can be contrasted with the sale of goods cases where the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.8 has codified
the common law implication of a reasonable price without reference to any such prior intention. However, in
these cases, the contract would have satisfied the formation requirements. Indeed, this supports our view that
implication should not be used to satisfy the formation requirements where such requirements are clearly not
satisfied. Also see E Peel (Ed), Treitel, The Law of Contract, 13th edn, (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2011),
55–60.
58. (1932) 147 LT 503.
59. [1941] AC 251.
60. The answer is no, such implication being precluded by the ‘‘subject to contract’’ clause.
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the parties’ intentions be objectively ascertained means that express words in the contract
are not determinative. It has been said that, in very strong and exceptional circumstances,
the courts are willing to go behind the express words used and ascertain whether the
parties had waived the express requirement of ‘‘subject to contract’’. The latter is in fact
illustrated by the recent example of RTS Flexible Systems v Mu¨ller,61 where the Supreme
Court inferred that parties had agreed to waive the ‘‘subject to contract’’ clause.
C. Avoiding over-narrowing of the contractual model
Just as we should not overly broaden the contractual model, we should not narrow it too
much. There is a real risk that courts may unduly limit the reach of contractual approach
by thinking that the law of unjust enrichment (which has developed only belatedly) can
now provide a solution to the parties.62 Evidence of such judicial thinking can be found
in Waller LJ’s judgment in Whittle Movers v Hollywood Express.63 In reversing the lower
court’s decision that an interim contract had been concluded between the parties, Waller
LJ accepted as correct the approach that the courts should not strain to find a contract
given that a restitutionary remedy can solve most if not all of the problems. With respect,
this seems to put the cart before the horse. It is a fundamental principle of the law of unjust
enrichment that a contractual regime precludes restitutionary relief.64 Accordingly,
whether a claim for work done in anticipation of a contract can succeed by way of a
restitutionary claim is not just separate from, but is subsequent to, the question whether
there was a contract governing the payment or non-payment of the work performed in the
first place.
The contractual model has a more obvious role to play in simple and straightforward
transactions. In such cases, save where both parties deny the existence of a contract, a real
implied contract can usually be found where one party has performed work that has been
accepted by the other party. Even if they have not agreed on the price for the work done,
it will usually not be objectionable to imply a term of reasonable remuneration,65 unless
the evidence clearly suggests that the parties are clearly not at consensus ad idem on this
matter. In ‘‘difficult’’ cases, however, the role for contract law is more curtailed. These
‘‘difficult’’ cases are typically ones where the parties are negotiating for a complex
contract on a ‘‘subject to contract’’ basis and have yet to reach agreement on the complete
set of terms, including ‘‘essential’’ terms. The role for contract law is more curtailed in
such cases because the parties may not have the precise intention to enter into legal
relations in the form of a limited collateral contract. Further, due to the complexity of the
transaction, there is the additional problem of whether the parties’ agreement is complete
and certain as amounting to an enforceable contract. The courts should not strain to find
a contract in each and every case merely to justify liability to pay for the work done, if
to do so is tantamount to imposing intentions on the parties.
61. [2010] UKSC 14.
62. Whittle Movers Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1189, [15]; Rooney [2010] EWHC 1807 (QB), [776].
63. [2009] EWCA Civ 1189.
64. R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘‘On the Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment’’ (2001) 117 LQR 273.
65. See, eg, Furmans Electrical Contractors v Elecref Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 170; [2009] TCLR 6, [32].
298 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
4/
11
/2
01
7 
09
:2
5
IV. WHAT IF THERE IS NO CONTRACT: CAN THERE BE A
RESTITUTIONARY CLAIM?
A. The distinction between contract and restitution
If no contract is found on the facts, cases have shown that the party who had carried out
the work prior to the execution of the final contract is not barred from claiming for
restitution.66 Although this has been largely accepted, Davies suggests that a party who
performs services prior to reaching any agreement is a risk-taker and, as such, neither the
law of contract nor the law of unjust enrichment should show sympathy to such a
claimant, who must be taken to have accepted the risk that he would not be able to recover
anything for the work done.67
Davies’ view finds seeming support in the case of Regalian Properties Plc v London
Docklands Development Corp,68 where the parties conducted their negotiations on a
‘‘subject to contract’’ basis. In that case, Rattee J held, inter alia, that, where parties had
used the words ‘‘subject to contract’’, and no contract had been concluded, losses should
lie where they fell.69 However, this reasoning has been subject to criticisms.70 First, as
Mannolini has astutely pointed out, in an unjust enrichment claim the only crucial question
is whether the defendant has been enriched.71 If no enrichment is shown, there could be
no claim in restitution. Rattee J need not have resorted to the reasoning that the phrase
‘‘subject to contract’’ generally bars a claim for restitution.
Secondly, and more generally, although there is ‘‘nothing unjust about being visited
with the consequences of a risk which one has consciously run’’,72 this raises a question
as to the nature and extent of such risk. It is arguable that the risk a claimant takes which
militates against the finding of liability in the law of unjust enrichment is not necessarily
the same risk that militates against the finding of a contract. There will be no liability
under the law of unjust enrichment if a claimant has taken a risk that his work will not be
paid for.73 On the other hand, there will be no liability under the law of contract if a
claimant has taken the risk that his work is not performed in pursuance of a concluded
contract. Thus, whilst a contractual regime also ensures that the claimant is remunerated,
the basis of remuneration is different.74 It is one that has been agreed between the parties
and one that reflects the claimant’s expectation interest. Remuneration in accordance with
the principles of unjust enrichment is assessed based on the gain to the defendant and a
66. Whittle Movers Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1189; British Steel [1984] 1 All ER 504.
67. Davies [2010] CLJ 467, 469.
68. [1995] 1 WLR 212.
69. Ibid., 231.
70. M Furmston, ‘‘Letters of Intent and Other Preliminary Agreements’’ (2009) 25 JCL 95.
71. J Mannolini, ‘‘Restitution Where an Anticipated Contract Fails to Materialise’’ (1996) 59 MLR 111,
113–114.
72. Stephen Donald Architects Ltd v King [2003] EWHC 1867 (TCC); 94 Con LR 1, [79] (HHJ Richard
Seymour QC).
73. See infra, Part V. The key idea underlining a successful claim in unjust enrichment in cases of anticipated
contracts is the defendant’s assumption of the risk of financial responsibility.
74. Of course, to the extent that the contractual measure of quantum meruit is often tied to reasonable value
of services, the assessment may be practically indistinguishable from the restitutionary measure barring any
restitutionary defences. However, this does not detract from the fact that the basis of liability is different.
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valuation that is imposed on the parties. It does not take into account the losses to the
claimant or what its bargaining position can command in the market.
Indeed, in Countrywide Communications Ltd v ICL Pathways Ltd,75 Nicholas Strauss
QC stated that ‘‘a court will at least be more inclined to impose an obligation to pay for
a real benefit, since otherwise the abortive negotiations will leave the defendant with a
windfall and the plaintiff out of pocket’’.76 It is suggested that a court will be more
inclined to impose an obligation to pay in such circumstances because it is less likely,
where a real benefit is conferred on the defendant, that the parties would have any prior
understanding that this real benefit should not be paid for even where the hoped-for main
contract is not concluded. Thus, in Whittle Movers, the defendant’s undertaking of
financial responsibility for the work, the claimant’s performance of the work, and the
defendant’s acceptance of the work do not necessarily amount to a collateral contract of
a smaller scope. There remains the question whether the claimant is prepared to run the
risk of not being paid if the hoped-for main contract is concluded. He may be prepared to
run the risk that he will not be paid on a certain basis and the parties’ rights and obligations
are not regulated by a contractual regime. But this is different from saying that the
claimant has run the risk of not being paid at all. Returning to Whittle Movers, one cannot
reasonably say that the parties had an understanding of any sort that the work would be
provided gratuitously if the hoped-for main contract is not concluded.
B. A test based on categorisation?
If we accept that there can be a claim in unjust enrichment following the failure of a
contractual claim, it remains to be examined how to draw the line between contract and
unjust enrichment. We do not think it is possible to lay down a more or less definitive
categorisation for analytic purposes, such as Havelock has suggested. According to
Havelock, situations in which work was done in anticipation of a contract can be
categorised under three main headings: (a) ‘‘non-contractual request situations’’, (b)
‘‘contractual request situations’’, and (c) cases concerning preparatory work rendered on
a ‘‘subject to contract’’ basis.77 While helpful in terms of drawing some general common
fact patterns in existing cases, such categorisation runs the risk of being too rigid.
It suffices to point to some potential problems. The general problem concerns the
predictive value of the categorisation. While useful as a way of understanding past cases,
it is difficult to say that an express undertaking per se would lead to the conclusion that
there is a contract. An express undertaking must be accompanied by other elements of a
valid contract to form a valid contractual obligation.78
More specifically, there is also the problem of distinguishing an ‘‘express undertaking’’
from an ‘‘informal arrangement’’. While it is true that the existence of an express
undertaking will usually result in contractual liability, it is less clear what an ‘‘informal
arrangement’’ is. It seems that the determinative question must be whether there is an
75. [2000] CLC 324.
76. Ibid., 349.
77. Havelock [2011] RLR 72, 73. In respect of contractual request situations, Havelock distinguishes between
‘‘an express undertaking by the defendant for payment of the services’’ (express undertaking) and ‘‘an informal
arrangement between the parties for payment of the services’’ (informal arrangement).
78. To be fair, Havelock does allude to this: see ibid., 74.
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undertaking to pay for the work, not how the arrangements were concluded. In Way v
Latilla,79 there was an assurance by the defendant that the plaintiff would receive some
interest in the concessions. While not as certain as the express undertaking in Brewer
Street Investments Ltd v Barclays Woollen Co Ltd,80 it is unclear why this amounted to a
mere ‘‘informal arrangement’’, which puts it in a category of ‘‘weaker’’ contractual
liability. In both cases, there was arguably some undertaking of responsibility (even
expressly in Way v Latilla). It seems therefore that the distinction between an ‘‘express
undertaking’’ and an ‘‘informal arrangement’’ is very thin and may be too difficult to
draw.
Instead of a categorisation approach, we would suggest a flexible approach which looks
to various indicators of a contract, as outlined above. If there is no contract between the
parties, one still needs to have a principled framework in unjust enrichment to cater for the
situation being discussed. This is an important task because many challenges to the
legitimacy of a restitutionary solution are aimed at the difficulty in casting the problem as
an unjust enrichment.81 This is a task that we take up in the following part.
V. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
A. Quantum meruit
The task is made more difficult by the continued incantation of the language of quantum
meruit (fair value for services rendered) and quantum valebant (fair value for goods
supplied) in unjust enrichment cases.82 Although modern cases have emphasised that
quantum meruit awards are founded on the principle of unjust enrichment and not on the
fiction of implied contract,83 the retention of the anachronistic language of quantum meruit
jeopardises the development of the law of unjust enrichment, as can be seen in the
following two instances.84
First, in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe,85 Lord Scott of Foscote considered
three ‘‘separate’’ grounds for the award of a personal remedy in common law: (a) unjust
enrichment; (b) quantum meruit; and (c) failure of consideration.86 However, there is
really only one cause of action—unjust enrichment. Failure of consideration is an unjust
factor and quantum meruit, in the context of Yeoman, is a label for a restitutionary
79. [1937] 3 All ER 759.
80. [1954] 1 QB 428.
81. See Countrywide Communications Ltd v ICL Pathway Ltd [2000] CLC 324, 349 (Nicholas Strauss QC);
Dietrich (2001) 21 LS 153, 161–164. S Hedley, ‘‘Implied Contract and Restitution’’ (2004) 63 CLJ 435, 446;
McFarlane (2010) 9(2) OUCLJ 95, 112–116; Davies [2010] CLJ 467, 475.
82. In RTS Flexible Systems Ltd [2010] UKSC 14; [2010] 1 WLR 754, the claim was couched in the language
of quantum meruit. In Benourad v Compass Group Plc [2010] EWHC 1882 (QB), Beatson J referred to the claim
in unjust enrichment as restitutionary quantum meruit throughout the judgment.
83. Benedetti v Sawiris [2010] EWCA Civ 1427, [140–141] (Etherton LJ).
84. In Australia, unjust enrichment has been rejected as a principle of direct application to claims by the High
Court: Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd [2009] HCA 44; 239 CLR 269. The quantum meruit count thus remains
a relevant claim for restitution under Australian law: see G Virgo, ‘‘The Law of Unjust Enrichment in the House
of Lords: Judging the Judges’’, in J Lee (ed), From House of Lords to Supreme Court: Judges, Jurists and the
Process of Judging (Oxford, 2010), 172–173.
85. [2008] UKHL 55; [2009] Bus LR 72; [2009] 1 WLR 1752.
86. Virgo (supra, fn.84), 180–182.
301LIABILITY FOR WORK WHERE CONTRACT DENIED
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
4/
11
/2
01
7 
09
:2
5
monetary award. Second, in Benedetti v Sawiris, Patten J, in quantifying the quantum
meruit award, suggested that courts have a wide discretion in determining ‘‘a fair and
reasonable sum’’.87 On appeal, Arden LJ opined that it would be inappropriate to depart
from market valuation in favour of the value to the particular defendant if the value was
less than market value.88 Such remarks indicate a failure to appreciate that quantum meruit
awards are restitutionary in nature, and what that means. Restitution for unjust enrichment
is awarded on the basis of principle, not discretion.89 Further, a value less than market
value may certainly be awarded by the application of the principle of subjective
devaluation.90
The confusion of legal principles could be better avoided if we analyse the cases in
terms of: (a) enrichment; (b) at the expense of; (c) unjust factor; and (d) defences. The
discussion below will focus on the elements of enrichment and unjust factor, which some
have said to be confusing. This has led some to take the view that the unjust enrichment
analysis is not up to the task of resolving the cases of precontractual liability. We would
agree that unjust enrichment analysis is not, alone, sufficient to explain all such
cases—but that is not to say that it never has explanatory force in this context.
B. Enrichment
The enrichment inquiry in a general context has two elements: (a) identification and (b)
quantification. Focusing on the first element, to prevent too much restitution, the
enrichment test should weed out cases where the work done was not of a kind that one
would reasonably expect to be provided gratuitously and where the claimant is taking a
risk. It should also prevent benefits from being forced upon the defendant.91 Both of these
concerns run large where some form of payment is sought for work done in anticipation
of a contract.
1. Assumption of risk of financial responsibility for the benefit
The test of enrichment in the context of work done in anticipation of contracts must be
formulated based on the theoretical underpinning of the law of unjust enrichment. This
paper proceeds on the basis that the law of unjust enrichment is underpinned by Weinrib’s
account of corrective justice.92 Drawing on the Kantian notion of ‘‘right’’,93 Weinrib
explains that parties enjoy pre-transactional equality of self-determination. This means
that individuals should not be deprived of their wealth unless they part with it voluntarily.
87. Benedetti v Sawiris [2009] EWHC 1330 (Ch), [58].
88. [2010] EWCA Civ 1427, [84].
89. Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548, 576 (Lord Goff of Chieveley).
90. Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2007] UKHL 34; [2008] 1 AC 561; [2008] Bus LR
49.
91. Falke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co (1886) 34 Ch 234, 248.
92. E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1995). An account of the law of unjust
enrichment based on corrective justice has received judicial endorsement in Canada. See: Peel (Regional
Municipality) v Canada (1992) 98 DLR (4th) 140 (SCC), 164; and Kingsway Investments v New Brunswick
(Department of Finance) [2007] 1 SCR 3, [32]. See also E Weinrib, ‘‘Correctively Unjust Enrichment’’, ch.2 of
R Chambers, C Mitchell and J Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP,
Oxford, 2009).
93. Individuals have the right to bodily integrity and ‘‘external objects of will’’.
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The first condition for restitutionary liability to arise is that the plaintiff has transferred
value to the defendant where the plaintiff’s intention to transfer is, in some sense,
defective. The second condition is that the defendant must have accepted the transfer of
value on the basis that it is not being given for nothing. The correlative structure of
restitutionary liability thus respects both the autonomy of the claimant and the
defendant.
Clearly, the unjust factors are used as means of identifying the plaintiff’s defective
intent, for the fulfilment of the first condition. As for the second condition, leading
commentators note that the concept of enrichment should take into account the
defendant’s freedom of choice.94 The question whether the defendant has been enriched
may thus be reformulated as a question as to whether the defendant has accepted the
transfer of value as not being provided gratuitously. This, however, does not mean that the
law accommodates all idiosyncratic preferences of the defendant.
As a starting point, the law distinguishes between money benefits and non-money
benefits. Money is the classic example of an incontrovertible benefit.95 This is not to say
that everyone in this world subjectively considers money to be a benefit. However, the
law’s compass of fairness and justice is based on the reasonable person. A reasonable
person desires commercial value and would thus, without more, consider money a benefit.
This starting premise cannot be faulted because money is in itself value and the measure
of value.96 Goods and services, on the other hand, are not in themselves value, although
they may have market value and may be converted into value upon sale. In exceptional
cases, the provision of goods and services may constitute a saving of a necessary expense;
but beyond such cases reasonable people may not consider their receipt as beneficial
because they may not desire the particular service or goods or are unwilling to pay for
them.
To prevent the infringement of the defendant’s freedom of choice, McInnes suggests
that it must be shown that the defendant has assumed the risk of financial responsibility
for the benefit.97 Mere desire is insufficient because one’s subjective valuation of a benefit
does not necessarily mean that one is willing to pay for it.98
2. Request from the defendant and receipt
Whilst a request from the defendant with the understanding that the requested work will
be paid for is indicative of his choice to assume financial responsibility for the benefit,
McKendrick has argued that the imposition of liability on the sole basis of a request for
the benefit could lead to a multiplicity of cross-claims, as parties in negotiations often
make requests of each other.99 McKendrick thus suggests that receipt is required to
94. P Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd edn (OUP, Oxford, 2005), 54–55; J Edelman & E Bant, Unjust
Enrichment in Australia (OUP, Melbourne, 2006) (hereafter ‘‘Edelman & Bant’’), 107–117; G Virgo, The
Principles of the Law of Restitution, 2nd edn (OUP, Oxford, 2006), 68.
95. BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783, 799 (Robert Goff J).
96. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd edn (2005), 53.
97. M McInnes, ‘‘Enrichment Revisited’’, ch.4 of JW Neyers, M McInnes and S Pitel (eds), Understanding
Unjust Enrichment (Hart, Oxford, 2004).
98. Ibid., 175.
99. McKendrick (supra, fn.5), 177.
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complete the restitutionary formula for liability.100 This shows that the defendant has in
his hands a benefit. On the other hand, cases such as Planche v Colburn101 and Brewer
Street Investments Ltd v Barclays Woollen Co Ltd102 appear to contradict the requirement
of receipt. It will be shown that receipt ought not to be a formal requirement.
Recent scholarship suggests that Planche v Colburn was not a case of restitution for
unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.103 It has been suggested that it is best treated as a
sui generis claim.104 Given that it was decided one and a half centuries before the
recognition of the principle of unjust enrichment in English law105 and that the state of
English contract law at that time was very different,106 the suggestion is defensible.
In Brewer Street, the parties were negotiating for a contract for a lease. Although the
principal matters were agreed, while negotiations were ongoing the defendants requested
the plaintiff landlords to carry out some alterations to the premises and undertook to pay
for the same. Negotiations subsequently broke down because the defendants insisted that
the plaintiffs grant them an option to purchase, although the plaintiffs had all along
maintained that they would not do so. The Court of Appeal awarded restitution to the
plaintiffs for the alterations that had been carried out.
The result in Brewer Street has been criticised on the basis that the defendants did not
receive the benefit and were thus not enriched, as the plaintiffs remained in possession of
the premises.107 The criticism is unmeritorious. In Brewer Street, the defendants did not
stipulate that coming into possession of the premises was a condition of payment. As a
matter of evidence, the defendants’ architect had written to the plaintiffs ‘‘unequivocally
accepting responsibility for the cost of the work’’108 and the defendants requested that the
work be commenced prior to the conclusion of the contract. In the circumstances, the
defendants took the risk that no lease would be granted to them. They chose to consider
themselves as having been benefited whether they would come into possession of the
premises or not.
Based on the above analysis of Brewer Street, one is compelled to conclude that receipt
is not a requirement in each and every case—it is open to the recipient to assume financial
responsibility for the enrichment whether the enrichment is ‘‘received’’ in some sense, or
not at all. Ultimately, what is crucial is the defendant’s choice of when and how he
considers himself to have been enriched and assumes financial responsibility for the
enrichment. One defendant may decide that he need not be in physical receipt of the full
performance but another defendant may decide that physical receipt of the full perform-
ance is a condition for payment. The defendant may choose what is of value to him and
100. Also see Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (OUP, 2011), 46–47. Burrows similarly advocates
that receipt is the crucial test for whether services are objectively beneficial.
101. (1831) 5 Car & P 58; 172 ER 896
102. [1954] 1 QB 428.
103. C Mitchell and C Mitchell, ‘‘Planche v Colburn’’, ch.4 of C Mitchell and P Mitchell (eds), Landmark
Cases in the Law of Restitution (Hart, Oxford, 2006).
104. Edelman & Bant, 114, citing GH Treitel, The Law of Contract, 11th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, London,
2003), 944.
105. Mitchell & Mitchell (supra, fn.103), 89–91.
106. Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548.
107. A Wyhill, ‘‘Enrichment, Restitution and the Collapsed Negotiations Case’’ (1993) 1 Aust Bar Rev 93,
112.
108. [1954] 1 QB 428, 438 (Romer LJ).
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is not confined strictly to economic value.109 That said, the defendant’s choice must be
construed objectively, in the interests of fairness to the claimant.
3. Free acceptance or assumption of risk of financial responsibility?
Where the claimant commences the performance of the work without the defendant’s
request, the claimant is usually a risk-taker. But, if the claimant delivers the work (which
a reasonable man would understand to be provided non-gratuitously by the claimant) to
the defendant and the defendant has received the same without protest where there is
reasonable opportunity to make such protest or reject the benefit, it may be said that the
defendant has assumed the risk of financial responsibility for the same.110 Equally, it may
be said that the defendant has freely accepted the enrichment. Is there a difference between
the two tests?
Turning first to the principle of free acceptance, Birks has described it in the following
terms: ‘‘[a] free acceptance occurs where a recipient knows that a benefit is being offered
to him non-gratuitously and where he, having the opportunity to reject, elects to
accept’’.111 Free acceptance was initially conceived by Birks to be a test showing that the
defendant values the benefit; but this conception had attracted many criticisms.112 Chief
among these criticisms is Burrows’ argument that a defendant who foregoes an
opportunity to reject the benefit may simply be acting indifferently.113 In defence of the
concept, Birks later clarified that the principle of free acceptance is concerned with the
unconscionability of the defendant’s conduct, and which therefore precludes him from
raising an argument based on subjective devaluation to deny that he has been enriched.114
On the clarified conception of free acceptance, Burrows remarked that Birks merged the
‘‘unjust factor’’ inquiry and the ‘‘enrichment’’ inquiry.115
Assumption of financial responsibility, on the other hand, is concerned with the
defendant’s freedom of choice and comes very close to Birks’ earlier conception of free
acceptance being based on the defendant’s valuation of the benefit. The difference
between the two tests is that a person who values a benefit may not be willing to pay for
it. Cases concerning goods and services generally reflect a requirement that the defendant
has assumed the risk of financial responsibility for the benefit conferred.
In Cressman v Coys of Kensington,116 the Court of Appeal held that a defendant would
have received an incontrovertible benefit if that benefit were readily returnable but the
109. Brenner v First Artist Management [1993] 2 VR 221, 257–259 (Bryne J).
110. Ibid.; McInnes (supra, fn.97), 181.
111. P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon, Oxford, 1989), 265. Also see R Goff and
G Jones, The Law of Restitution (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1966), 30.
112. A Burrows, ‘‘Free Acceptance and the Law of Restitution’’ (1988) 104 LQR 576; G Mead, ‘‘Free
Acceptance: Some Further Considerations’’ (1989) 105 LQR 460; M Gardner, ‘‘The Role of Subjective Benefit
in the Law of Unjust Enrichment’’ (1990) 10 OJLS 42.
113. Burrows (1988) 104 LQR 576. Cf J Edelman, ‘‘The Meaning of Loss and Enrichment’’, in R Chambers,
C Mitchell and J Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, 2008), 234.
Edelman argues that in such cases the defendant has a very small desire for the benefit ‘‘at least as much as the
minimal effort required to speak out and ask the cleaner to stop’’ but questions if such desire met the de minimis
for imposition of restitutionary liability.
114. P Birks, ‘‘In Defence of Free Acceptance’’, in A Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law of Restitution (1991),
105–146.
115. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (2011), 57–58.
116. [2004] EWCA Civ 47; [2004] 1 WLR 2775.
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defendant chose to retain it upon request for return. This test of enrichment is distinct and
separate from Birks’ clarified version of free acceptance, which the court did consider but
did not ultimately adopt as the basis for finding enrichment. The proof of an incontrovert-
ible benefit necessarily means that the defendant is precluded from making any argument
based on subjective devaluation. Underlining this ‘‘returnable benefit’’ test is the idea that
the defendant has made a choice not to return a benefit when its return has been demanded
and where the benefit could have been easily returned to the claimant. Such circumstances
indicate that the defendant has assumed the risk of financial responsibility for the benefit
as this is the only way in which he may become entitled to retain it. On the facts of
Cressman, the defendant’s conduct (including the fact that he gave the mark to his partner)
showed amply that he valued the mark. Making a choice to retain a benefit that is easily
returnable and for which a request has been made for its return constitutes forgoing a
reasonable opportunity to reject the benefit. That there has been a request for return
negates any benefit of doubt that may be given to the defendant that he did not know that
the benefit was not provided gratuitously.117
However, Weatherby v Banham118 shows that the Court of Appeal in Cressman may
have articulated the test too narrowly and the proper basis for finding there is enrichment
is simply evidence that the defendant has assumed the risk of financial responsibility for
the benefit. In Weatherby v Banham, the claimant successfully recovered from the
defendant the price of issues of the Racing Calendar sent to the defendant’s house.
Unknown to the claimant, the defendant inherited the house from the subscriber of the
Racing Calendar, who had passed away. Enrichment was established notwithstanding that
the claimant did not ask for the return of the magazine. Although Lord Tenterden CJ was
of the view the action was maintainable ‘‘[i]f the defendant receive[d] the books, and
use[d] them’’,119 there was no evidence to suggest that the defendant had read any of the
magazines and thus subjectively valued the magazine, apart from his failure to return the
magazines or notify the publisher of the death of the subscriber. Indeed, Lord Tenterden
CJ was satisfied that the particular defendant should be liable because ‘‘the books [came]
addressed to the deceased gentleman, whose estate ha[d] come to the defendant and he
[kept] the books’’.120 The result can, however, be justified on the basis that the defendant
had assumed the risk of financial responsibility for the magazines. The issues were
delivered over a two-year period during which the defendant, who was aware that the
subscriber had passed away, had never once attempted to notify the claimant of the
mistake or offered to return them. The defendant could not have reasonably argued that he
did not know that the issues were provided non-gratuitously given that the Racing
Calendar was not a magazine that was provided gratuitously to the public.
In Rowe v Vale of White Horse DC,121 Lightman J approved the principle of free
acceptance as a test of enrichment but he did not find that a case of free acceptance had
been established on the facts of the case. In illustrating the principle with a common
example, it is clear that Lightman J had in mind the principle of free acceptance based on
117. Cf G Virgo, ‘‘Enrichment: The Case of the Cherished Mark’’ (2004) 63 CLJ 280, 282. Virgo suggests
that the defendant’s knowledge that the claimant wanted the mark to be returned was indicative of fault on the
defendant’s part.
118. (1832) 5 C & P 228.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. [2003] EWHC 388 (Admin); [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 418.
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the idea that the defendant has assumed the risk of financial responsibility for a benefit
which he did not reject:122
‘‘On the facts of any ordinary case, a householder who receives and uses services from a supplier
such as the Council must reasonably expect to pay for such services and will know that he has the
option to reject them, and he will accordingly be liable under the principle of free acceptance to pay
for them.’’
Nevertheless, an argument based on assumption of the risk of financial responsibility
may attract the same criticisms that have been directed at Birks’ original conception of
free acceptance. Burrows’ point, that a defendant who fails to reject the goods or services
rendered may simply be indifferent to the benefit received, seems, at least superficially,
equally applicable to an argument premised upon such failure signalling an assumption of
the risk of financial responsibility. It may also be argued that the principle is inconsistent
with other areas of the law. For example, mere acquiescence does not amount to
acceptance of an offer in contract law and the law of torts does not impose a positive duty
to avert harm to the defendant.123 Hence, why should the burden fall on the defendant to
reject the benefit in the law of unjust enrichment? There is also a complaint that the
principle is unclear on the steps a recipient is required to take to resist the benefit,
especially if rejection may cause great inconvenience to him.124
We will first address Burrows’ criticism based on the possibility that the defendant may
be indifferent to the benefit. While the defendant’s act of forgoing an opportunity to reject
the benefit may not indicate that he subjectively values the benefit (a matter of his state of
mind), his doing so can certainly be seen as having chosen to pay for the benefit (a matter
of observable conduct). The choice is to be construed objectively based on all the
circumstances, and the defendant’s conduct is thus important.
This answer is insufficient until one can justify putting the burden on the defendant to
resist the benefit. The justification is rooted on the basis that only a reasonable defendant
deserves the law’s respect for his freedom of choice. A reasonable person would take
advantage of reasonable opportunities to indicate his choices. The law protects the
defendant who has not been given a reasonable opportunity to indicate his choice, but not
otherwise. The law does not put the burden on the claimant to find out whether the
defendant desires the benefit because the claimant may be genuinely mistaken in believing
that the defendant had assumed financial responsibility for the benefit. If so, the plaintiff
would never have realised that there was a need to make further inquiries. Extending
protection only to a reasonable defendant is not an idea that is foreign to the law of unjust
enrichment when it comes to protecting the defendant’s autonomy. We see the same
principle at work in the defence of change of position.125 In cases of defendant-instigated
changes of position, Bant has persuasively argued that the defendant’s reliance on the
receipt must be reasonable because ‘‘there is no very strong case for protecting defendants
who fail to take reasonable precautions to protect themselves, such as by making enquiries
122. Ibid., [14].
123. Mead (1989) 105 LQR 460, 461–464.
124. Ibid., 464–466.
125. Recent accounts of the change of position defence have argued that the purpose (or one of the purposes)
of the defence of change of position is the protection of the defendant’s autonomy: see R Grantham and
C Rickett, ‘‘A Normative Account of Defences to Restitutionary Liability’’ [2008] CLJ 92, 119–124; E Bant, The
Change of Position Defence (Hart, Oxford, 2009), 217–218.
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as to the nature of a received payment’’.126 Similarly, in the present context, it may be said
that there is no strong case for protecting defendants who fail to take reasonable steps to
protect their freedom of choice, such as by rejecting the benefit or protesting against the
conferment of the benefit.
Finally, what constitutes reasonable steps will depend on the circumstances of each
case, a concept that has been applied in many areas of private law. One must not equate
the complexities of the factual inquiry with unworkability of the legal test.
4. Test of enrichment for pure services based on character of services?
Where services performed by the claimant are concerned, our proposed test of enrichment
does not focus on the type of service, distinguishing pure services from services which
result in an end product. Nor does our test focus on the receipt of the services as a formal
requirement. As explained above, where the services in question do not constitute a saving
of a legally or factually necessary expense, the focus of our test is on the defendant’s
assumption of the risk of financial responsibility.
In a recent paper, Havelock similarly argues that pure services can qualify as an
enrichment and receipt should not be the focus of the test of enrichment for pure
services.127 However, Havelock recommends a test of enrichment for pure services that
focuses on the character of performance. In his view, pure services will qualify as a
negative enrichment where (a) they are performed by the claimant pursuant to the
defendant’s request; (b) they constitute a saving of a factually necessary expense to the
defendant instead of being merely preparatory; and (c) they are received by the defendant,
whether in full or in part, as long as it can be established that the defendant has been saved
a factually necessary expense.128 The key idea underlining Havelock’s enrichment test for
pure services is the proof of saving of a factually necessary expense to the defendant.
The problem with Havelock’s test of enrichment for pure services is that it is under-
inclusive and potentially uncertain. First, an enrichment will be shown only in situations
where the defendant has requested the services. This ignores the fact that a defendant may
choose/accept a particular benefit notwithstanding that the conferral was initiated by the
claimant. Further, Havelock does not explain why a request emanating from the defendant
is crucial if the test of factual necessity can be satisfied on the facts. The proof of a
factually necessary expense overcomes the argument of subjective devaluation at the first
stage of showing the existence of an enrichment.129
Second, the claimant must prove that the services constitute a saving of a factually
necessary expense to the defendant. The test therefore does not capture situations where
the services performed by the claimant constitute the saving of a legally necessary expense
to the defendant, for example, where the defendant is under a statutory duty to perform
certain services. The test also does not capture situations where the defendant merely
126. Ibid., 151–155, drawing reference to P Birks, ‘‘Overview: Tracing, Claiming and Defences’’, in P Birks
(ed), Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon, Oxford, 1995), 325.
127. Havelock [2011] RLR 72, 78–83.
128. Ibid., 83.
129. But McInnes stressed that ‘‘the defendant is enriched only to the extent that he was saved a necessary
expense’’. The defendant is entitled to plead subject devaluation at the stage of quantification of the enrichment.
See McInnes (supra, fn.97), 185.
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desires the services and is willing to pay for them, but the services are not in any real sense
‘‘necessary’’ to him.
Finally, the concept of ‘‘factually necessary expense’’ is inherently uncertain, as nothing
is strictly necessary. An overly inflexible test of factual necessity will render the test
impracticable and of little use. An overly flexible test, on the other hand, will severely
compromise the law’s respect for an individual’s freedom of choice. McInnes has argued
that the identification of factually necessary expenses can begin by drawing analogies with
rules concerning the enforceability of contracts for the provision of necessities of life to
incapacitated persons.130 McInnes, however, admits that beyond necessities of life, it is
unclear how far the courts will go in identifying factually necessary expenses.131
Our proposed test for enrichment therefore avoids the problems which Havelock’s test
may run into. By recognising that both the saving of a necessary expense and the
defendant’s assumption of the risk of financial responsibility can establish an enrichment,
our analysis is more realistic and avoids stretching the reasonable limits of the concept of
factual necessity.
C. Unjust factor
Despite a line of cases on precontractual restitutionary liability, the exact unjust factor that
should apply in such cases is still uncertain. This disappointing state of affairs is partly due
to the courts’ preoccupation with the question of risk, which is in itself a conclusion.132
Further, in some cases, the defendant may have conceded on the element of unjust factor,
as in Benedetti v Sawiris,133 thereby limiting the court’s analysis.
In the present context, there are several possible unjust factors: (a) free acceptance; (b)
failure of consideration; and (c) unconscionability, ‘‘which may be the basis of the
doctrine of proprietary estoppel’’.134
1. Free acceptance
Free acceptance as an unjust factor is problematic. In his last work, Birks admitted regret
in creating a defendant-sided category called ‘‘free acceptance’’.135 He attributed the
elimination of this false category to Burrows’ analysis.136 Essentially, Burrows pointed out
that many of the cases relied on by Birks as cases of ‘‘free acceptance’’ can be explained
on other grounds.137 Burrows also found Mead’s arguments against the concept of ‘‘free
130. Ibid., 186–187.
131. Ibid., 187.
132. J Edelman, ‘‘Liability in Unjust Enrichment where a Contract Fails to Materialise’’, in A Burrows and
E Peel (eds), Contract Formation and Parties (OUP, Oxford, 2010), 160.
133. [2010] EWCA Civ 1427, [143]: ‘‘Mr Sawiris had accepted that Mr Benedetti was entitled to payment
for his service, whether the claim was to be based on free acceptance or failure of consideration’’.
134. G Jones (ed), Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, 7th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007),
[26.004] (hereafter ‘‘Goff and Jones’’); Countrywide Communications Ltd [2000] CLC 324, 343 (Nicholas
Strauss QC).
135. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd edn (2005), 42–43. Cf Goff and Jones, [1.056].
136. Burrows (1988) 104 LQR 576.
137. A Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 2nd edn (London, 2002), 402–407.
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acceptance’’138 persuasive.139 Indeed, in Cressman, the Court of Appeal was apprised of
the difficulties with the concept of ‘‘free acceptance’’ both as an enrichment test and as a
ground for restitution.140 As the case did not turn on the concept of ‘‘free acceptance’’, the
court did not decide whether it should be cut out from the law. Later cases which continue
to mention the concept of ‘‘free acceptance’’ did not consider its conceptual difficulties.141
As such, it remains to be seen whether ‘‘free acceptance’’ may truly continue to be viewed
as an unjust factor, though the academic view has clearly inclined against this.
2. Unconscionability
‘‘Unconscionability’’ as an unjust factor is likewise fraught with difficulties. First, debate
remains rife as to whether the law of unjust enrichment should also focus on the
defendant’s conduct as a ground for restitution, as opposed to focusing only on the
claimant’s imperfect intention to benefit the defendant and other policy-motivated
grounds.142 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that ‘‘unconscionability’’ is ‘‘vague
and wide-ranging’’.143
Perhaps, as an attempt to address the concern as to its vagueness, Goff & Jones explains
‘‘unconscionability’’ on the basis of proprietary estoppel, presumably meaning that the
elements of proprietary estoppel may similarly be found in the unjust factor of
unconscionability, ie (a) assurance; (b) reliance; and (c) detriment.144 If so, why should the
response be restitution, instead of compensation for reliance loss?145 Arguably, further
development along such lines by folding together ‘‘unconscionability’’ and ‘‘proprietary
estoppel’’ could be seen as tantamount to ‘‘fashioning’’ a sword of promissory estoppel in
the guise of unjust enrichment. The merits of such a development seem questionable, at
least.
Finally, it may be inappropriate to characterise the typical behaviour of a defendant in
cases concerning precontractual performance of work as being wrongful or unconsciona-
ble. Although Barker observes that the courts consider the relative fault of the parties in
the course of negotiations to be a relevant factor,146 pointing out that the courts do
138. (1989) 105 LQR 460; discussed ante, text to fnn 123–124.
139. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 2nd edn (London, 2002), 402–407.
140. [2004] EWCA Civ 47; [2004] 1 WLR 2775, [26–33] (Mance LJ).
141. Chief Constable of Greater Manchester v Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd [2008] EWCA 1449; [2009] 1 WLR
1580, [45–48] (Morritt C); [66] (Maurice Kay LJ); Benedetti v Sawiris [2010] EWCA Civ 1427, [143].
142. Edelman and Bant, 12; Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd edn (2005), 42–43. In relation to unconscionable
bargains, see Edelman and Bant, 32, in which the authors consider unconscionable conduct as a species of
equitable wrongdoing. Cf M Bryan, ‘‘Unconscionable Conduct as an Unjust Factor’’, ch.15 of S Degeling and
J Edelman (eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (2008): Bryan, in response, advances the view that
unconscionable conduct can be an unjust factor. Also see Goff & Jones, [1.058–1.059] for support of accepting
unconscionability as an unjust factor, provided it is clearly defined.
143. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (2011), 301.
144. Evidence of such language is found in Nicholas Strauss QC’s judgment in Countrywide Communications
Ltd [2000] CLC 324, 349.
145. Although fulfilment of expectations in specie is the typical outcome in cases of proprietary estoppel,
Robertson argues that the paramount concern in determining the appropriate relief is to ‘‘prevent the claimant
suffering harm as a result of his or her reliance’’. Therefore, a claimant’s reliance interests may be adequately
protected by way of an award of compensation in cases where the detriment suffered is purely financial or where
the detriment may be quantified accurately. See A Robertson, ‘‘The Reliance Basis of Proprietary Estoppel
Remedies’’ [2008] Conv 295.
146. K Barker, ‘‘Coping with Failure—Reappraising Pre-Contractual Remuneration’’ (2003) 19 JCL 105.
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investigate the reasons for a defendant’s unilateral withdrawal from the negotiations, the
courts’ focus on fault is of debatable value.147 In many cases, it may be difficult to
determine who caused the breakdown of negotiations. This is exemplified by the
disagreement between the judges as to whether the defendant had been at fault in Brewer
Street.148 It is noteworthy that Denning LJ contrasted a situation where parties fell out on
a point which had not been agreed at all with a situation where one party was seeking to
alter matters which have reached in-principle agreement.149 Where the former situation is
concerned, Denning LJ was of the view that parties could not be said to be at fault if the
negotiations broke down. But, even in the latter case, commercial parties should have the
right to revisit agreed matters if required by new considerations to adjust the allocation of
risks.
In this connection, it is important to note that the law does not presently impose a duty
to negotiate in good faith. Nor can one describe unilateral withdrawal from negotiations
for commercial reasons or self-interest as reprehensible conduct,150 justifying a legal
response.
3. Failure of consideration
Failure of consideration is a well-established unjust factor under English law.151 It is an
action for something which was given for a purpose which has failed. Consideration does
not bear the same meaning as contractual consideration and is to be understood as a basis,
a purpose or a contemplated state of affairs.152
Edelman has recently argued that failure of consideration is the ground for restitution
in precontractual liability cases.153 He argues that the question to ask in these cases is
whether the claimant’s performance of the work was on the objective basis that it was part
of an exchange.154 To put it simply, the question is whether the claimant has performed on
the shared basis that the work will be remunerated. As such, where the defendant refuses
to pay remuneration to the claimant, the basis has failed. Edelman further stressed that the
basis which has failed must be shared between the parties and it is to be construed
objectively.155 He also dismissed a unilateral mistake as a possible ground for restitution
147. Brewer Street [1954] 1 QB 425, 446 (Denning LJ); Countrywide Communications Ltd [2000] CLC 324,
349; Yule v Little Bird (5 April 2001) Unreported; 2001 WL 542118.
148. [1954] 1 QB 425. Somervell and Romer LJJ concluded that the defendant had been at fault. Denning LJ
found neither party to have been at fault.
149. Brewer Street [1954] 1 QB 425, 436–437.
150. K Hayne, ‘‘Anticipated Contracts that Fail to Materialise’’, in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Unjust
Enrichment in Commercial Law (2008), 247.
151. Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32.
152. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1989), 223.
153. See Edelman (supra, fn.132). Also see Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (2011), 372. Burrows
similarly argues that failure of consideration is the unjust factor in such cases and the basis fails when the
‘‘defendant has refused to perform its promise (partially or totally) which was the claimant’s basis for rendering
a benefit to the defendant’’. Cf Havelock, who argues that the objective basis in precontractual liability cases is
the common expectation that a contract will be entered into between the parties and, under this contract, the
claimant will be remunerated for the work performed: see Havelock [2011] RLR 72, 86. However, this analysis
does not explain why the claimant is entitled to remuneration when the basis fails, that is, when no contract has
been concluded if both parties expect that work done by the claimant will be remunerated under the contract.
154. Edelman (supra, fn.132), 168.
155. Edelman (supra, fn.132), 164–168.
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for bilateral non-contractual transactions.156 Drawing an analogy with contract cases,
Edelman posits that in precontractual liability cases the law is similarly concerned with the
‘‘joint autonomy of parties and not the impairment of the autonomy of just one of
them’’.157
Edelman’s analysis has helpfully cast light on this area of the law. There is some degree
of congruence between the enrichment inquiry proposed in this paper158 and the unjust
factor inquiry argued by Edelman—the common thread being the defendant’s assumption
of the risk of financial responsibility for the benefit which in turn reflects the fundamental
concern for the defendant’s autonomy. It must be emphasised that the concept of the
defendant’s assumption of the risk of financial responsibility for the benefit does not
render the analysis a contractual one in substance. The analysis in unjust enrichment only
arises upon determining that there is no contract governing the payment or the non-
payment of the benefit. There could be no contract where the court found that no contract
has been formed on the evidence159 or where both parties deny the existence of a contract.
Further, the defendant’s assumption of the risk of financial responsibility for the purpose
of determining liability in unjust enrichment is not the same as his agreement to pay to the
claimant a certain price in pursuance of a contract.160
However, one final obstacle remains. Davies has argued that failure of consideration is
an unsuitable unjust factor for precontractual liability cases because the law161 does not
presently allow partial failure of consideration which will be an obstacle for cases where
the defendant has made some payment to the claimant.162 There are two oft-cited reasons
for this requirement.163 First, restitution cannot be permitted to subvert contractual
allocation of risk.164 Second, it may be difficult to apportion an entire obligation.165
However, these concerns do not apply in precontractual liability cases. There is no
contract and hence no concern of the law of unjust enrichment subverting the law of
contract.166 Further, modern courts are capable of engaging in complex and difficult
valuation exercises.167 In any event, not every case involves complex and difficult
apportionment. Accordingly, the requirement of total failure of basis cannot be justified in
precontractual liability cases.
156. Such transactions concern the situation where two parties are in the course of negotiation and have yet
to reach a binding agreement.
157. Edelman (supra, fn.132), 171.
158. See ante, Part V(B).
159. See ante, Part III.
160. See ante, Parts III(B) and IV.
161. Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344; [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
155.
162. Davies [2010] CLJ 467, 475.
163. There are two other possible reasons for this requirement: (a) to prevent too much restitution; and (b) to
prevent a claimant obtaining restitution when the defendant has conferred a benefit on him. Maher found all four
reasons to be unmeritorious: see F Maher, ‘‘A New Conception of Failure of Basis’’ [2004] RLR 96,
105–106.
164. Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd [2001] HCA 68; 208 CLR 516, [106]
(Gummow J).
165. Ibid.
166. However, the parties may agree to waive all legal claims against each other in the event of a failure to
reach an enforceable agreement.
167. Maher [2004] RLR 96, 105.
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D. Quantification
Traditionally, quantum meruit awards are assessed objectively, by reference to market
value. Benefit is valued at the time it is conferred. However, controversy remains as to the
relevance of the price which a defendant would have been willing to pay for the benefit.168
The price that a defendant would have been willing to pay for a benefit may reflect his
subjective valuation, which may or may not be linked to his objectively determined ability
to obtain the same from the market at that preferred price.
One basic starting point is that the law of unjust enrichment is not concerned with the
protection of a defendant’s subjective valuation but his freedom of choice. It has been
suggested that Birks’ earlier conception169 of the subjective devaluation based strictly on
subjectivity of value is wrong as a matter of principle.170 In Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland
Revenue Commissioners,171 Lord Hope of Craighead clarified that market value may be
departed from based on the circumstances of the enrichee, that is, what the enrichee could
have otherwise realistically chosen. Burrows suggests that a price at which the defendant
requested the benefit is relevant because a person may choose something only at a
particular price.172 Burrows appears to restrict the relevance of the price which a
defendant would have been willing to pay for the benefit to one that has been
communicated to the claimant. If the claimant has duly provided the benefit without any
protest on the price, this would have been a case of contract. One may therefore surmise
that Burrows has in mind cases of incomplete or anticipated contracts where parties have
communicated or negotiated on the contractual remuneration.
The recent case of Benedetti v Sawiris173 provides an opportunity to examine the
relevance of parties’ precontractual bargainings to the valuation of the enrichment
provided by one party to the other. The dispute concerned the measure of restitution for
brokerage services provided by Benedetti to the defendant companies. The market value
of the services was determined to be â36.3 million. At first instance, Patten J assessed the
award at â75.1 million, based on an offer made by Sawiris to Benedetti after the
completion of the services.174 On appeal, it was held that the services should have been
valued at the market rate. Both Arden and Etherton LJJ agreed that the parties’ prior
agreement (the Acquisition Agreement) as well as Sawiris’ post-transaction offer of â75.1
million were irrelevant to the assessment of the award.175 However, they clearly differed
in their reasoning.
Arden LJ held that the court may take into account the parties’ prior agreement on
remuneration or such other communications between them but will weigh these commu-
nications accordingly, in light of the circumstances.176 She recognised that such prior
168. J Edelman, ‘‘The Measure of Restitution’’ [2010] RLR 1, 4.
169. P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985), 109.
170. See Edelman (supra, fn.113), 235–239; M Yip, ‘‘Use Value of Money’’ (2010) 30 LS 586, 601–602.
171. [2007] UKHL 34; [2008] 1 AC 561; [2008] Bus LR 49, [49].
172. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (2011), 61. Burrows does not draw a sharp distinction between
the identification of the enrichment and the valuation of the enrichment.
173. [2010] EWCA Civ 1427.
174. [2009] EWHC Civ 1330. See criticisms of Patten J’s judgment in A Lodder, ‘‘Unjust Enrichment and
the Assessment of Quantum Meruit Awards’’ (2010) 126 LQR 42.
175. Rimer LJ agreed with the reasons given by Arden and Etherton LLJ in relation to the valuation of the
services and only gave reasoned judgment on issues of costs and interest: [2010] EWCA Civ 1427, [172].
176. Ibid., [63].
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agreement would carry little or no weight if it became irrelevant to the parties’ dealings
or for the determination of the remuneration and agreed with Patten J that the Acquisition
Agreement was no longer relevant to the parties’ dealings in the present case as the
agreement contemplated a very different transaction.177 Drawing support from Way v
Latilla, Arden LJ further opined that the court may, in an appropriate case, depart from
market rates in preference of rates that have been agreed between the parties in
precontractual bargainings or rates which are based on the past course of dealing between
the parties.178 She emphasised that the court would only take into account the ‘‘outward
manifestation of the parties’ common intentions’’ but not one party’s subjective wishes not
shared by the other party.179 Hence, she found that Patten J had erred in assessing the
quantum based on Sawiris’ post-transaction offer of â75.1 million as that had not been
accepted by Benedetti.
On the other hand, Etherton LJ held that market valuation is the default position, subject
to the application of the principle of subjective devaluation or the principle of subjective
revaluation, if the latter is found to exist.180 These two principles involve taking into
account the actual characteristics of the defendant and circumstances to show that the
actual benefit is less than or above the ordinary market value.181 The relevant character-
istics or circumstances do not include the defendant’s emotional response to the claimant’s
work or how generous he is.182 Of relevance are the conditions which justify adjusting the
objective value of the benefit to a reasonable person in the same position as the
defendant.183 Etherton LJ did not find that there was any condition on the facts to justify
the increase of the objective value of the benefit. He was of the view that Way v Latilla
concerned a contract for reasonable remuneration and Patten J had thus erred in relying on
Lord Atkin’s speech in this case in increasing the award from â36.3 million to â75.1
million.184
While both Arden and Etherton LJJ were right in stating that the valuation of the
services in the law of unjust enrichment is not concerned with the defendant’s subjective
valuation, the reasoning of neither judge is entirely satisfactory. Arden LJ’s analysis,
especially her emphasis on the ‘‘common intention’’ of the parties, has a strong contractual
undertone. Moreover, she treats an in-principle agreement on the rate of contractual
remuneration in itself to be relevant evidence of the market value. However, the parties’
in-principle agreement on a contractual remuneration may not always reflect the objective
value of the benefit conferred. There are benefits of a contractual relationship which
parties take into account when engaged in negotiations. They may propose terms which
they are willing to commit to if and only if the parties enter into a contract, for example,
where the parties are contemplating a long-term contract.185 A party may be willing to
offer a lower price in the hope of securing a long-term working relationship with a
reputable partner.
177. Ibid., [67].
178. Ibid., [72].
179. Ibid., [72].
180. Ibid., [142–145].
181. Ibid, [144–147].
182. Ibid, [145].
183. Ibid, [145].
184. Ibid, [148–149].
185. See Whittle Movers v Hollywood Express [2009] EWCA Civ 1189; [2009] 2 CLC 771.
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By contrast, a plain reading of Etherton LJ’s judgment appears to suggest that the
parties’ precontractual bargainings are irrelevant. But this would be incorrect. The
objective market value of a benefit refers to the rate for ‘‘a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position’’.186 As such, the defendant’s view of the price as disclosed in
parties’ precontractual bargainings is relevant to the extent that it is evidence of the
objective value of the benefit to a reasonable person in the defendant’s position at the
moment of conferral of the benefit in question.187 That said, one should note that post-
transaction bargainings may be irrelevant and may not reveal the objective value of the
benefit to the defendant at the moment of conferral. For one, the parties may have been
influenced by the threat of litigation.188 Further, where the work concerned has no ready
objective market value, the parties’ in-principle agreement on the rate of remuneration
may be indicative of the objective value of the work to the defendant. An appeal to the
Supreme Court is pending in Benedetti v Sawiris and it is hoped that the Supreme Court
will take advantage of this opportunity to consider and clarify the relevant principles.
There remains the question of ‘‘the degree of abstraction, and relevant qualities of the
defendant’’ that are to be ascribed to the reasonable recipient of a similar benefit.189
Edelman preliminarily concludes that there is no simple resolution, drawing reference to
the different approaches taken to assess the characteristics of a reasonable person in
determining whether a breach of duty has occurred in the law of torts.190 It is submitted
that the issue in the law of unjust enrichment is less complicated than that which bedevils
the law of torts. The breach of duty issue in the law of torts concerns whether there is
liability in the first place. There are policy concerns underlining the reasonable standard
of care to which people should adhere, especially in the area of professional negligence,
where there is an impact on industry practices. For example, whether a junior doctor
should be held to a lower standard than a senior doctor is a difficult question.
In summary, the quantification of restitutionary awards concerns the extent of liability
which is underpinned by a principal concern to protect the defendant’s autonomy. The
question is how much it would cost a particular defendant to acquire the same benefit in
the market. The answer will depend on the kinds of choices which a particular defendant
is able to make in the circumstances and the availability of credible evidence to prove
these alternative choices.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that contract and unjust enrichment each have a proper role
to play in cases of anticipated contracts and bright doctrinal lines can be drawn between
the two areas of the law. We have explained that the courts should not adopt an overly
expansive implied contract approach that amounts to an artificial construction of parties’
intentions. We have also recommended a framework for a claim in unjust enrichment for
186. Edelman (supra, fn.113), 231.
187. Lodder (2010) 126 LQR 42.
188. In Benedetti v Sawiris [2010] EWCA Civ 1427, [87], Arden LJ agreed, obiter, that an offer made under
the threat of litigation can affect the weight to be attached to the offer as evidence of the market value.
189. Edelman [2010] RLR 1, 4.
190. See J Edelman, ‘‘Torts and Equitable Wrongs’’, in A Burrows (ed), English Private Law, 2nd edn (OUP,
Oxford, 2006), [17.46–17.53].
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precontractual liability, to address any concerns that the law of unjust enrichment is
inadequate to deal with such claims. Although, at a very general level, both contract and
unjust enrichment are concerned with an understanding that the work done will be paid
for, the nature and extent of the risk taken by the claimant, the nature of the liability under
the respective area of the law and the substantive principles are not the same. It must also
be emphasised that unjust enrichment analysis only arises upon determining that there is
no contract between the parties in relation to the payment or non-payment of the work
done. Contract and unjust enrichment are thus alternative claims, and not concurrent
claims. An understanding that the work done by one party shall be paid for by the other
does not amount to a contract in every case if, for example, the parties have not come to
an agreement on ‘‘essential’’ terms or if they do not have the intention to enter into legal
relations. The same facts may, however, be sufficient to support liability in unjust
enrichment.
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